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I. Introduction
Suppose that the United States Supreme Court were to hold that samesex marriage is protected by the Federal Constitution. What implications
might such a ruling have for marriage or family law more generally?
Answering such a question is difficult, at least in part, because an important
component of such an analysis would focus on the specific reasoning of the
Court, and there are clear dangers in making predictions about possible
changes in family law based on an opinion that has not yet been written.
Discussing the implications of the Court’s imagined ruling is daunting
for yet another reason. The Court’s recent opinions analyzing the
constitutionality of laws targeting on the basis of sexual orientation do not
provide clear guidance with respect to the reach of the protections actually
recognized, which makes discussing the likely reach of an imagined
opinion even more dangerous. Nonetheless, this article will not only assume
that the Court will find same-sex marriage protected by the Federal
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Constitution, but will also make some assumptions about what the opinion
will (and will not) say and do.
Part II of this article focuses on two of the Court’s recent decisions
involving laws targeting on the basis of orientation, and then makes some
predictions regarding how the Court might craft a decision holding that
state same-sex marriage bans violate constitutional guarantees. This part
then discusses how some states might try to treat same-sex marital couples
differently from other couples with respect to the rights and benefits to
which they are entitled under state law, and whether such attempts would
likely pass constitutional muster. Part III focuses on a different way that
states might react to the Court’s finding that the Federal Constitution
protects the right to marry a same-sex partner—they might emphasize (or
perhaps deemphasize) marital status when determining individuals’ rights
and responsibilities, e.g., by modifying their approaches to the rights and
obligations of cohabitating couples. The article concludes that a holding
that the right to marry a same-sex partner is constitutionally protected is
unlikely to cause significant changes in family law, although states reacting
to such a decision are more likely to diverge than converge with respect to
the degree to which they distinguish between marital and non-marital
couples.
II. Family, Orientation, and the Constitution
Two recent Supreme Court cases—Lawrence v. Texas1 and Windsor v.
United States2—are helpful to examine when seeking to determine what a
decision striking down same-sex marriage bans might look like. While the
Court in both cases struck down laws disadvantaging same-sex couples, the
analyses offered neither specified the level of scrutiny employed nor
whether the rights at issue were fundamental rather than mere liberty
interests. That failure to specify has led to some confusion about the reach
of the protections recognized by the Court, a result that is likely to be
repeated if the Court remains silent about the level of scrutiny employed or
the nature of the liberty interest protected in the envisioned decision
regarding same-sex marriage.

1.
2.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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A. Lawrence
Lawrence involved a challenge to “a Texas statute making it a crime
for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct.”3 The Court made clear that the “petitioners were adults . . . . [and
that] [t]heir conduct was in private and consensual.”4 The question
presented was whether “the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the
private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”5
In analyzing whether substantive due process protects the right of
adults of the same sex to engage in intimate relations, the Lawrence Court
discussed6 a number of cases including Griswold v. Connecticut,7
Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 Roe v. Wade,9 Carey v. Populations Services
International,10 Bowers v. Hardwick,11 and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.12 The Court’s inclusion of these cases
in the context of assessing whether Texas’s same-sex sodomy ban passed
constitutional muster sent mixed messages. On the one hand, by discussing
cases involving interests such as contraception and abortion that are
protected by the right to privacy,13 the Court implied that adult, consensual
intimacy was also protected by the right to privacy. Indeed, after discussing
these cases involving contraception and abortion rights, the Court explained
that Bowers, in which the Court had upheld a Georgia law criminalizing
sodomy,14 “was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct
today,”15 which presumably means that the privacy jurisprudence existing

3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
4. Id. at 564.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 564–78
7. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
11. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
13. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (noting that the Due
Process Clause protects the rights to marry, to have children, and to contraception and
abortion).
14. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (“We do not agree . . . that the sodomy laws of some
twenty-five States should be invalidated.”).
15. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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at the time Bowers was decided required a different result.16 Yet, even after
overruling Bowers,17 the Court neither stated that adult consensual intimacy
was a fundamental interest nor that strict scrutiny was being employed to
strike down the Texas statute.18 But if adult consensual intimacy is a mere
liberty interest, then a state can prohibit such intimacy as long as the state’s
doing so is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.19 Whether or not
Texas had a legitimate interest in prohibiting same-sex intimacy,20 the
rational basis test hardly sets a high bar to overcome insofar as states wish
to impose other burdens on members of the LGBT community.21
Lawrence sent a mixed message in yet another respect. On the one
hand, the Lawrence Court chided the Bowers Court for having
misapprehended the nature of the injury imposed by a statute criminalizing
same-sex sodomy. “To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to
engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”22 The Court
explained that sodomy prohibitions “seek to control a personal relationship
that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”23 Here,
while refusing to comment about whether same-sex relationships must be
formally recognized, the Court implies that such relationships have worth.24
16. The Court also suggested that cases decided subsequent to Bowers further
undermined that holding. See id. at 573 (“Two principal cases decided after Bowers cast its
holding into even more doubt.”).
17. See id, at 578 (“Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).
18. See id, at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[N]owhere does the Court's opinion declare
that homosexual sodomy is a ‘fundamental right’ under the Due Process Clause; nor does it
subject the Texas law to the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if
homosexual sodomy were a ‘fundamental right.’”).
19. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (“[O]ur decisions lead
us to conclude that the asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The Constitution also
requires, however, that Washington's assisted-suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate
government interests.”) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993)).
20. Justice Scalia believed that the Texas law was rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. Cf. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816–
17 (11th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that the burden imposed by Lawrence is rather easy to
overcome).
22. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
23. Id.
24. See Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships: On Values,
Valuing, and the Constitution, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 285, 293 (2006) (“By suggesting
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So, too, when explaining why sodomy laws were unconstitutional, the
Court explained that “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring.”25 But the fact that sexual conduct
may be part of relationship that is more enduring would hardly be a reason
militating in favor of striking down the prohibition unless the more
enduring relationship were itself of worth.26 That said, however, the Court
not only expressly declined to address whether same-sex marriage was
constitutionally protected,27 but the Court also failed to include the right-tomarry cases when discussing the right to privacy.28 It was simply unclear
whether the Court was directing attention away from same-sex marriage
because it had not yet decided whether same-sex marriage was protected by
the Federal Constitution or whether, instead, it had already decided but
simply did not wish to bring attention to its having already done so.29
The Lawrence Court also mentioned Romer v. Evans,30 in which “the
Court struck down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”31 While suggesting that a
challenge to the Texas statute on equal protection grounds was “tenable,”32
the Lawrence Court feared that its striking down the law on that basis
would lead some to believe that “a prohibition would be valid if drawn
differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and
different-sex participants.”33 The Court reasoned that “[e]quality of
that this enduring personal bond provides one of the reasons that the same-sex relations are
protected, the Court is attributing positive constitutional weight to same-sex relationships.”).
25. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
26. See J. Richard Broughton, The Criminalization of Consensual Adult Sex after
Lawrence, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 125, 158 (2014) (discussing “the
language in Lawrence . . . that the right is (or might be) predicated upon the existence of an
intimate relationship or upon conduct designed to promote emotional intimacy between
people”).
27. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve . . . whether
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter.”).
28. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
29. Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This case ‘does not
involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and
logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.”).
30. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
31. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558, 574.
32. .Id.
33. Id. at 575.
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treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected
by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and
a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”34 Thus, by striking
down the Texas prohibition on due process grounds, the Court was both
affirming the value of same-sex relationships and the dignity of members of
the class, whose relationships could not be demeaned.35
Traditionally, relationships have been accorded more constitutional
weight than sexual relations, so a finding that same-sex adult consensual
relations are protected suggests that same-sex relationships may also be
protected.36 That conclusion was given further support by Windsor v.
United States,37 in which the Court addressed whether the federal
government could define marriage as a union of one man and one woman
for federal purposes.38
B. Windsor
In Windsor, the Supreme Court held that section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act was unconstitutional.39 When holding that the section violated
Fifth Amendment guarantees,40 the Court did not make clear whether the

34. Id.
35. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (DOMA “tells those
couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal
recognition. This places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a second-tier
marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the
Constitution protects.”) (citing 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
36. See Mark Strasser, State Marriage Amendments and Overreaching: On Plain
Meaning, Good Public Policy, and Constitutional Limitations, 25 LAW & INEQ. 59, 110
(2007) (“By analogizing same-sex relationships to marital relationships and holding that
adult, consensual, same-sex relations are constitutionally protected . . . the Lawrence Court
implies that same-sex relationships have constitutional protection.”).
37. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
38. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2695 (2013) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.”).
39. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (“DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the
liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.”).
40. See id. (“And though Congress has great authority to design laws to fit its own
conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
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law offended substantive due process, equal protection, or both kinds of
guarantees. Clarification of the basis upon which Windsor was decided
might have important implications for any opinion striking down state
same-sex marriage bans.41
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not
contain an equal protection clause42 but, instead, incorporates those
guarantees within the due process component of that amendment.43 But that
means that DOMA’s incompatibility with due process guarantees does not
establish whether the statute failed to pass muster as a matter of substantive
due process or as a matter of the unstated but incorporated equal protection
guarantees.44
Sometimes, the Windsor Court seemed to be discussing due process
and sometimes equal protection. Thus, part of the opinion focused on the
nature of the implicated liberty interest at issue.45 But the Court also noted
that the federal provision’s “principal effect [wa]s to identify a subset of
state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal.”46 By suggesting that
“the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean
those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage,”47 the Court
suggested that equal protection guarantees had been violated.
The envisioned opinion striking down state same-sex marriage bans
might focus on some of the language in Windsor discussing the nature of
the interest at issue and emphasize the Windsor point that “marriage is more
41. Indeed, were Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation of Windsor correct, that
opinion would seem to provide little if any basis upon which courts could strike down state
same-sex marriage. See id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court does not have
before it, and the logic of its opinion does not decide, the distinct question whether the
States, in the exercise of their ‘historic and essential authority to define the marital relation,’
may continue to utilize the traditional definition of marriage.”) (internal citations omitted).
42. U.S. CONST., amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”).
43. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (2013) (“The liberty protected by the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any
person the equal protection of the laws.”) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S., 497, 499–500
(1954); Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Penã, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995)).
44. Cf. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The sum of all the Court's
nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is invalid (maybe on equal-protection grounds,
maybe on substantive-due-process grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous federalism
component playing a role).”).
45. See id. at 2695 (“DOMA divests married same-sex couples of the duties and
responsibilities that are an essential part of married life and that they in most cases would be
honored to accept were DOMA not in force.”).
46. Id. at 2694.
47. Id. at 2695.
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than a routine classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits,” 48
thereby emphasizing the unique nature of the interest at issue. Perhaps the
Court will simply state that “the decision to marry is a fundamental right”49
and then will explain that same-sex couples cannot be precluded from
exercising that right.50 If the Court were to adopt that approach, there might
be a number of implications, depending upon what the right to marry
includes.
Suppose, for example, that a state were to recognize same-sex
marriage but were to accord fewer benefits and obligations to marriages
involving same-sex couples than it did to marriages involving different-sex
couples. Just as some states tried to accord a special status to different-sex
marriage by creating a separate civil union status for same-sex couples that
involved the same rights and obligations of marriage but was nonetheless
called something else,51 states might try to accord a special status to
different-sex marriage by recognizing same-sex marriage but according
fewer rights and obligations to that status.
The Windsor Court discussed the “States' interest in defining and
regulating the marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees.”52 Here,
the court seemed to recognize that “the incidents, benefits, and obligations
of marriage . . . may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one
State to the next.”53 A state might claim that as long as it recognizes the
right of same-sex couples to marry, it has no constitutional obligation to
treat those marriages in exactly the same way as it treats other marriages.
After all, it might be argued, some states have two kinds of marriages—
marriages and “covenant marriages”54—so states deciding to create more
than one kind of marriage should not pose any constitutional difficulties.
48. Id. at 2692.
49. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).
50. Cf. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992–993 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(stating that when same-sex “plaintiffs seek to exercise the fundamental right to marry under
the Due Process Clause” they are exercising a fundamental right that has always existed).
51. See, e.g., 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1204 (a) (2010) (“Parties to a civil union shall have
all the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from
statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil law, as
are granted to spouses in a civil marriage.”).
52. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
53. Id.
54. See Allison Gerli, Comment, Living Happily Ever After in a Land of Separate
Church and State: Treatment of Islamic Marital Contracts, 26 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW.
113, 114 (2013) (“In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Louisiana, Arkansas, and
Arizona enacted covenant marriage statutes encouraging long-term marriage as countermeasures to the enactment of no-fault divorce statutes.”).
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When discussing “the long-established precept that the incidents,
benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples
within each State,”55 the Windsor Court likely did not have in mind the
difference between covenant marriages and other marriages and presumably
would have no objection to states creating more than one kind of marriage
as long as all those eligible to marry were permitted to choose which kind
of marriage they wished to celebrate. However, just as section 3 of DOMA
was unconstitutional because it “identif[ied] a subset of state-sanctioned
marriages and ma[d]e them unequal,”56 a state attempting to create a
separate subset of marriages (with fewer rights and responsibilities) solely
comprised of same-sex couples would also likely be found constitutionally
deficient. Thus, the Windsor Court implies that were a state to distinguish
among the benefits afforded to married couples by refusing to afford to
same-sex couples the same options that different-sex couples had, the Court
would examine that differentiation “with skepticism, if not
a jaundiced eye.”57
What of civil unions? Both because the Windsor Court expressly
refused to characterize marriage simply as “a routine classification for
purposes of certain statutory benefits”58 and because the Windsor Court
confined its “opinion and its holding . . . to . . . lawful marriages,”59 it seems
likely that the Court would not find that the relevant constitutional
guarantees had been met were a state to afford same-sex couples the option
of entering into civil unions but not of celebrating marriages. Such a
compromise would “undermine[] both the public and private significance of
state-sanctioned same-sex . . . [unions].”60 But the state does not do
constitutional harm when it affords the option of entering into a civil union
to all couples eligible to marry. Thus, Windsor should not be understood to
preclude the states from recognizing civil union status but merely to
preclude the states from reserving civil union status for same-sex couples
and marriage for different-sex couples.
While Windsor suggests that marriage is a special status that dignifies
relationships and thus involves an important liberty interest,61 the opinion
55. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
56. Id. at 2694.
57. Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Com'n, 514 U.S. 35, 43 (1995) (citing Digital Equip.
Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994)).
58. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 .
59. Id. at 2696.
60. Id. at 2694.
61. Id.
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also had a strong equal protection component. For example, the Court
explained that “the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law
[section 3 of DOMA] are to demean those persons who are in a lawful
same-sex marriage,”62 and expressly noted that the “liberty protected by the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition
against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.”63 The
Court’s suggestion that the DOMA section offended equal protection
guarantees was important, at least in part, because equal protection
guarantees also constrain the states. Indeed, the Court’s suggestion that “the
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth
Amendment right all the more specific and all the better understood and
preserved”64 was important for a few reasons. First, lest there be any doubt,
it suggests that equal protection was one of the bases upon which the
federal statute was struck down, even if not the only basis. Second, it seems
to be offering a warning to the states. Because the Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection guarantees apply to the states,65 the Court seems to be
providing notice that state marriage amendments are also constitutionally
vulnerable.66 It would be unsurprising for any opinion striking down state
same-sex marriage bans to quote Windsor’s comment about the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantees.
One confusing element of Windsor is that it never articulates the
standard of review being used to strike down the statute at issue.67 Perhaps
the Court is subjecting the statute to intermediate scrutiny, although it might
instead be using a less deferential form of rational basis review.68
62. Id. at 2695.
63. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S., 497, 499–500
(1954); Adarand Constr. Inc. v. Penã, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995)).
64. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
65. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
66. Cf. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“My guess is that the
majority . . . needs some rhetorical basis to support its pretense that today's prohibition of
laws excluding same-sex marriage is confined to the Federal Government (leaving the
second, state-law shoe to be dropped later, maybe next Term).”).
67. Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The opinion does not resolve and indeed does
not even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the
Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for
more than mere rationality.”).
68. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But the Court certainly does not apply anything
that resembles that deferential framework.”) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320
(1993)). However, the Court may be applying rational basis with bite scrutiny. See
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Regardless of the level of scrutiny that Windsor is inferred to be employing,
Lawrence and Windsor raise the distinct possibility that the Court when
striking down state same-sex marriage bans will neither state what standard
of review is being employed nor even whether the guarantees violated are
due process, equal protection, or both.
The difficulty posed by the Court’s failure to articulate the level of
review is not that the determination of the constitutionality of the state
marriage bans depends upon whether, for example, heightened scrutiny or a
less deferential rational basis is used, because it is assumed for purposes of
this article that such bans will be struck down.69 But there are other family
issues associated with marital status, and whether states will be permitted to
make certain legal distinctions may well depend upon the analysis used to
strike down state same-sex marriage bans.
C. Targeting Orientation
The Court could strike down state same-sex marriage bans as a
violation of due process or equal protection guarantees. Further, whether
basing the decision on due process or equal protection, the Court might
strike down such laws using some sort of rational basis review or, instead,
some higher level of scrutiny. The difficulty that both legislators and courts
will likely face is that the Court’s (probable) refusal to spell out the level of
scrutiny employed and the Court’s (probable) discussion of both equal
protection and due process issues will almost guarantee great confusion
with respect to the breadth or depth of the protections thereby accorded.
Suppose that the Court were to hold that the fundamental right to
marry70 includes the right to marry a same-sex partner.71 That would be
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“[S]ome objectives, such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group,’ are not legitimate state interests. When a law exhibits such a desire …, we have
applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the
Equal Protection Clause.”) (internal citations omitted).
69. If indeed the Windsor Court is employing heightened rational basis review to
strike down section 3 of DOMA, then it may well be that the same level of rational basis
review would result in the Court’s striking down state same-sex marriage bans. The Court
suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees are at least as robust as
those contained in the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2695 (2013).
70. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 83 (1987) (discussing “the fundamental right to
marry”).
71. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
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important because state same-sex marriage bans would be subjected to strict
scrutiny.72 But it would be important for purposes here for a very different
reason, namely, that statutes targeting other interests that did not trigger
strict scrutiny might not be so readily invalidated.
Consider adoption rights. Neither the right to adopt nor the right to be
adopted has been viewed as a fundamental interest triggering strict
scrutiny.73 That a statute targeting a fundamental right had been struck
down would not suggest that a statute targeting a mere liberty interest
would also be constitutionally infirm. That said, a statute’s constitutionality
will not be upheld if there is no legitimate basis for the statute.74 If the
Court were to find, for example, that a statute limiting or burdening the
adoption rights of same-sex married couples was designed “to identify a
subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal,”75 the Court
might well strike down such a statute because in effect it created “a secondtier marriage.”76 For this very reason, a state distinguishing among marital
couples by restricting stepparent adoptions to different-sex spouses of
individuals with children would presumably trigger Windsor’s preclusion of
differentiating among marital couples within a state.
III. Non-Marital Rights
The analysis of the envisioned decision would presumably protect the
rights of same-sex married couples, but a separate issue would involve the
degree to which such a decision would impact the rights of non-marital
cohabitants. States might react in very different ways were the Court to
hold that the Federal Constitution protects the right to marry a same-sex
partner. Some states would likely (continue to) expand the rights of non(suggesting that the fundamental right to marry includes the right to marry a same-sex
partner).
72. Id. (“Because plaintiffs seek to exercise their fundamental right to marry, their
claim is subject to strict scrutiny.”) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978)).
73. See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 812
(11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is no fundamental right to adopt or to be adopted”).
74. See Florida Dep’t. of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79,
91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“[H]omosexual persons are allowed to serve as foster parents
or guardians but are barred from being considered for adoptive parents …even where, as
here, the [would-be] adoptive parent is a fit parent and the adoption is in the best interest of
the children . . . . [T] here is no rational basis for the statute.”).
75. U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
76. Id.
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marital couples, while others might not only refuse to expand those rights
but might instead contract them.
A. Cohabitant Rights
Some states impose rights and obligations on members of cohabiting
couples, whereas other states reserve marriage-like benefits for marital
couples. A variety of state interests are implicated in such decisions. On the
one hand, states may believe that restricting such benefits will increase the
number of individuals who marry or remain married.77 On the other, states
may recognize that growing numbers of individuals are cohabiting,78 and
may believe as a matter of public policy that the longevity and stability of
such relationships should also be promoted by awarding such couples
benefits.79
Some states already protect cohabiting relationships and provide for a
“marital-like property distribution following a cohabitative relationship.”80
While an important factor in such distributions involves the parties’ intent,81
it is not necessary for the parties to have specified with particularity their
intentions in writing. “[W]hen the parties have demonstrated through their
actions that they intend to share their property in a marriage-like
relationship, a court does not need to find specific intent by each cohabitant
as to each piece of property.”82
Other states permit cohabiting individuals to “lawfully contract
concerning property, financial, and other matters relevant to their

77. See, e.g., State v. Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 664 (Alaska 2014) (“[W]e can assume
that providing benefits to spouses promotes marriage among adults who can marry.”).
78. See, e.g., Courtney Thomas-Dusing, Note, The Marriage Alternative: Civil
Unions, Domestic Partnerships, or Designated Beneficiary Agreements, 17 J. Gender Race
& Just. 163, 163–64 (2014) (noting that “cohabitation [is] increasing in popularity”); see
also Diana Adams, Equality for Unmarried America: Expanding Legal Choice for America's
Diverse Families, 4 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 231, 232 –233 (2013) (“Living with a partner
without marriage has also become common in both different-sex and same-sex couples.”).
79. See Adams, supra note 78, at 248 (“All Americans would benefit from having a …
domestic partnership plan that could allow two people to share a household, share health
insurance, and acknowledge their status as family without welcoming the government into
their division of finances and the question of whether they are in a romantic relationship.”).
80. Boulds v. Nielsen, 323 P.3d 58, 62–63 (Alaska 2014).
81. Id. at 63 (stating that “[t]he first step in dividing an unmarried couple's property is
to examine the couple's intent”).
82. Id. at 64.
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relationship.”83 Such agreements are enforceable as long as they do not
violate public policy, as they would if “sexual services [were to] constitute
the only, or dominant, consideration for the agreement.”84 Some states
impose additional limitations on cohabitation contracts, for example, New
Jersey requires not only that such agreements be in writing but that the
parties have had advice of counsel.85
Will states be more willing to enforce cohabitation agreements or,
perhaps, impose marriage-like rights and obligations on cohabiting
couples? Perhaps. Legislatures may decide to impose such obligations if
sufficient need is established, especially if state courts have announced that
they will not impose such obligations but will instead defer to the
legislature.86 However, other legislatures may decide that awarding
benefits to non-marital couples might undermine the special nature of
marriage or, at any rate, might induce fewer couples to either marry or
remain married.87
A different but related issue involves whether the state or private
employers will afford benefits to individuals living in non-marital
relationships. At least some employers have offered benefits to non-marital
couples, at least in part, because same-sex couples did not have access to
marriage benefits.88 Both public and private employers may feel less of a
need to provide those benefits for non-marital partners if indeed marriage
equality is recognized within the state.89 While some commentators suggest
83. Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998).
84. Id. at 146.
85. See Maeker v. Ross, 62 A.3d 310, 316 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2013)
(“[E]nforcement of palimony agreements may only occur in those instances where the
agreement has been reduced to writing and the parties have each had the benefit of
independent counsel.”).
86. See Davis v. Davis, 643 So.2d 931, 934–35 (Miss. 1994) (“We are of the opinion
that public policy questions of such magnitude are best left to the legislative process, which
is better equipped to resolve the questions which inevitably will arise as unmarried
cohabitation becomes an established feature of our society.”).
87. Cf. Adams, supra note 78, at 241 (“As marriage is laden with public policy
incentives to get citizens married, such as health insurance and immigration status, couples
sometimes get married for practical reasons other than a desire to create a commitment to
lifelong romance.”).
88. See Nancy D. Polikoff, What Marriage Equality Arguments Portend for Domestic
Partner Employee Benefits, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 49, 52 (2013) (“Employee
benefits limited to same-sex partners . . . were framed as an equity issue for same-sex
couples who could not marry.”).
89. See Armin U. Kuder & Marcia Kuntz, Understanding the Legal Issues
Surrounding Same-Sex Marriage Leading Lawyers on Adapting to Recent Supreme Court
Decisions Impacting Family Law: Legal Challenges of Divorce for Same-Sex Couples,
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that the revocation of such benefits would occur because of the employers’
belief that such benefits would not be desired,90 it seems at least as likely
that some employers would suggest that although they recognize that some
individuals would still like to have domestic partnership (rather than
marital) benefits, the unfairness concerns91 implicated by same-sex
marriage bans are not present when same-sex couples are permitted to
marry.
Many same-sex and different-sex couples would prefer not to marry
and would nonetheless like to receive those benefits, and it may be thought
unjust to require couples to marry in order to receive such benefits. 92
However, at least as a matter of federal constitutional mandate, it seems
unlikely that the Court would hold that public employers must accord the
same benefits to marital and non-marital couples.93 Further, state
constitutional law may prohibit according marital benefits to non-marital
couples,94 and there may be insufficient popular support to amend the state
constitution to permit or require treating marital and non-marital couples
equally, especially if same-sex marriage is not at issue. That said, if trends
continue and it remains true that “fewer people are marrying,”95 then
perhaps there will be sufficient support to amend a state constitution to
permit or require equal benefits for marital and non-marital couples.
B. Parenting Rights
ASPATORE, 2013 WL 4391623, *4 n.49 (2013) (“A consequence … of the … rapid growth in
the number of states permitting same-sex marriage is that employers that previously offered
benefits to same-sex domestic partners…might reexamine those policies and require
couples . . . [to] get married . . . in order to continue receiving employer-provided benefits.”).
90. See Adams, supra note 78, at 246 (“Unfortunately, when same-sex marriage
passes in a state, domestic partnership and civil union options are sometimes lost . . . . This
is a dramatic presumption that these citizens would prefer marriage.”).
91. Cf. Carlin Meyer, Who Cares?: Reflections on Law, Loss, and Family Values in
the Wake of 9/11, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 653, 658 (2002–2003) (discussing “the unfairness
of excluding domestic partners”).
92. See generally Polikoff, supra note 88.
93. Cf. supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (noting that the Court seems to
distinguish between marital and non-marital relationships for constitutional purposes).
94. See Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich.,748 N.W.2d 524, 538 (Mich.
2008) (“[I]f there were any residual doubt regarding whether the marriage amendment
prohibits the recognition of a domestic partnership for the purpose at issue here, this
language makes it clear that such a recognition is indeed prohibited ‘for any purpose,’ which
obviously includes for the purpose of providing health-insurance benefits.”).
95. Amy L. Wax, The Family Law Doctrine of Equivalence, 107 MICH. L. REV. 999,
1017 (2009).
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If same-sex marriage were recognized as federally protected, then
certain parenting rights would also presumably be recognized, for example,
the presumption of parentage that arises when a child is born into a marital
relationship.96 A separate question, however, is whether states will be more
expansive with respect to the parental rights of unmarried adults who have
adopted parental roles.
First, it should be noted that several states recognize functional
parents,97 i.e., adults who are accorded some sort of parental status, lack of
adoptive or biological tie to the child notwithstanding.98 The focus here is
on the recognition of non-marital functional parents rather than, for
example, functional parents who are stepparents.99
Recognizing functional parents can have a variety of benefits.100
Precisely because individuals take on functional parenting roles in a variety
of contexts, the recognition of same-sex marriage will not end the need for
or the usefulness of recognizing functional parents.101 Nonetheless, the
recognition of same-sex marriage may have a role in whether or the degree
to which courts will recognize functional parentage, as the following series
of Vermont cases helps illustrate.

96. See Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014)
(“The pervasive and powerful common law presumptions that link both spouses in a
marriage to a child born of the marriage-the presumption of legitimacy within a marriage
and the presumption of a spouse's consent to artificial insemination-apply to this [same-sex]
couple.”).
97. See Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status
for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 671, 677 (2012) (“In
some states, courts or the legislature have recognized either full parental or quasi-parental
status based on a functional parent-child relationship.”).
98. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form:
Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419,
422 –23 (2013) (“Functional parents are people who function in parental roles without
having any formal legal status as parents.”).
99. See id. at 424 (noting that functional parents might be cohabiting with or married
to the biological or adoptive parent).
100. See id. at 438 (“[T]here are three bases given for justifying the need for functional
parenthood: (1) for the benefit of children; (2) for the benefit of formal parents; and (3) for
the benefit of functional caregivers”).
101. See Jason D. Hans & Martie Gillen, Social Security Survivors Benefits: The Effects
of Reproductive Pathways and Intestacy Law on Attitudes, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 514,
515 (2013) (“This functional parenthood approach . . . allows legal parentage to be awarded
based on the role an adult takes in a child's life . . . . [N]on-traditional parents, such as
stepparents and same-sex partners of genetic parents, can gain legal recognition in the
absence of biological ties or legal adoption.”).
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C. Vermont on Functional Parentage
Vermont was one of the first states to recognize second parent
adoption,102 which permits a parent’s non-marital partner to adopt his or her
child,103 assuming that no one else has parental rights with respect to that
child.104 That way, each member of a same-sex couple raising a child could
establish legal ties to that child.105
Titchenal v. Dexter106 involved a custody dispute “between two
women who had both participated in raising a child adopted by only one of
them.”107 At issue was whether Chris Titchenal would be recognized as a
functional parent, where “[f]or the first three and one-half years of [the
child]Sarah's life, … [Chris] cared for the child approximately 65% of the
time.”108 Chris had never adopted Sarah because she had mistakenly
believed that she was precluded by law from doing so.109 The Vermont
Supreme Court suggested that it did not have the power to grant Titchenal a
remedy,110 noting that “[e]quity generally has no jurisdiction over imperfect
102. See Grossman, supra note 97, at 675.
103. See Jennifer Sroka, Note, A Mother Yesterday, But Not Today: Deficiencies of the
Uniform Parentage Act for Non-Biological Parents in Same-Sex Relationships, 47 VAL. U.
L. REV. 537, 538 n.5 (2013) (“The process of second parent adoption allows a non-biological
parent to become a legal parent through adoption, while the natural or first adoptive parent
retains legal parental status.”) (quoting DENIS CLIFFORD, FREDERICK HERTZ & EMILY
DOSKOW, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 84 (Emily Doskow ed., 15th ed.
2010)).
104. See J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Breaking the Mold and Picking up the
Pieces: Rights of Parenthood and Parentage in Nontraditional Families, 51 FAM. CT. REV.
104, 111 (2013) (“Even in states permitting second-parent adoption, consent of the
noncustodial biological parent is required.”).
105. See In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (allowing same-sex
partner of parent to adopt that parent’s child).
106. 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997).
107. Id. at 683.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 686–87.
[P]laintiff contends that she did not attempt to adopt Sarah at the time defendant
did because the parties believed that Vermont's then-current adoption laws
would not permit it. ‘A person or husband and wife together . . . may adopt any
other person’”) (citing 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 431 (repealed 1996). The language
of the statute, however, certainly did not preclude plaintiff from seeking to adopt
Sarah; indeed, as of December 1991, when Sarah was only five months old, at
least one Vermont probate court had allowed the female partner of a child's
adoptive mother to adopt the child as a second parent.
110. Id. at 684 (“We find no legal basis for plaintiff's proposal. Courts cannot exert
equitable powers unless they first have jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.”)
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rights arising from moral rather than legal obligations; not every perceived
injustice is actionable in equity—only those violating a recognized legal
right.”111 While recognizing that “there are public-policy considerations
that favor allowing third parties claiming a parent-like relationship to seek
court-compelled parent-child contact,”112 the court explained that “these
considerations are not so clear and compelling that they require us to
acknowledge that de facto parents have a legally cognizable right to parentchild contact, thereby allowing the superior court to employ its equitable
powers to adjudicate their claims.”113 The court concluded that “absent
statutory authority extending the family court's jurisdiction to adjudicate
third-party visitation requests,114 … legal parents retain the right to
determine whether third-party visitation is in their children's best
interest.”115
The Vermont functional parent jurisprudence may have changed in
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins116 in which a biological parent challenged
the parentage of her former civil union partner.117 Lisa and Janet entered
into a civil union in December, 2000,118 while they were still living in
Virginia.119 Lisa was artificially inseminated with sperm provided by an
anonymous donor, resulting in the birth of IMJ.120 When IMJ was about
four months old, the family moved to Vermont.121 A little less than a year
later, Lisa and Janet separated.122 Lisa moved back to Virginia but filed in a
Vermont court to end their civil union.123 The court granted Lisa temporary
physical and legal custody but also granted Janet parent-child contact.124
(citing In re Marriage of Ryall, 201 Cal. Rptr. 504, 512 (Cal. App. 1984)).
111. Id. at 684 (citing In re E.C., 387 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Wis. 1986)).
112. Id. at 689.
113. Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 689 (Vt. 1997).
114. Id. at 690 (citing OR.REV STAT. § 109.119(1)(1989)).
115. Id. (citing Finck v. O’Toole, 880 P.2d 624, 627 (Ariz. 1994)).
116. 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006).
117. See id. at 955 (“Lisa Miller–Jenkins appeals a family court decision finding her
ex[-]partner, Janet Miller–Jenkins, to be a parent of their three-year-old child conceived
via artificial insemination.”).
118. Id. at 956.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 956 (Vt. 2006) (“After the
separation, in September 2003, Lisa moved to Virginia with IMJ. . . . On November 24,
2003, Lisa filed a petition to dissolve the civil union in the Vermont family court in
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Although Lisa permitted Janet and IMJ to have parent-child contact at
first, she later refused to do so.125 In addition, Lisa filed in Virginia to
establish IMJ’s parentage.126 The Virginia and Vermont courts were in
contact with each other,127 although they were unable to reach a resolution
and each court claimed to have jurisdiction to decide the matters before
it.128 Ultimately, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act and the Vermont version of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act established that Vermont rather than Virginia had
jurisdiction over the case,129 and the Virginia Supreme Court held that Lisa
was bound by the first Virginia appellate court ruling deferring to the
Vermont ruling that Vermont rather than Virginia should be deciding the
parentage issues.130
For purposes here, the Miller-Jenkins Vermont Supreme Court
decision is relevant because of how it treated parentage. First, the court
noted that Janet was a presumptive parent by virtue of her having been
Lisa’s civil union partner.131 Yet, Janet’s presumptive parentage by virtue of
her civil union status might have been problematic in this case. At the time,
Rutland.”).
124. See id. at 955.
125. Id. (“Although Lisa permitted the first court ordered parent-child-contact weekend,
she did not allow Janet to have parent-child contact after that date, nor did she allow Janet to
have telephone contact with IMJ, as the family court had ordered.”).
126. Id.
127. See id. at 957 (“[T]he Vermont and Virginia courts consulted by telephone . . . .”).
128. See id. at 956–57 (Vt. 2006).(“[O]n July 19, 2004, the Vermont court reaffirmed
its ‘jurisdiction over this case including all parent-child contact issues,’ stated that it would
not ‘defer to a different State that would preclude the parties from a remedy,’ and made clear
that the temporary order for parent-child contact was to be followed.”). But see id. at 957
(“On September 9, the Virginia court held it had jurisdiction to determine the parentage and
parental rights of IMJ and that any claims of Janet to parental status were ‘based on rights
under Vermont's civil union laws that are null and void under VA. CODE § 20–45.3.’”).
129. See id. at 959.
130. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 825 (Va. 2008) (“The Court
of Appeals further held in the first Virginia appeal that Vermont law governed the parties’
dispute, and that the courts of Virginia were bound by Vermont’s interpretation of its own
law.”); id. at 827 (“[T]he Court of Appeals’ holding in the first Virginia appeal is binding
under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine.”).
131. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 967 (Vt. 2006) (“If we were
to . . . conclude biology controlled, a child born from artificial insemination would have no
second parent…unless the putative second parent adopted the child. . . . [S]uch a holding
would be wrong.”). See id. at 970 (“Many factors are present here that support a conclusion
that Janet is a parent, including, first and foremost, that Janet and Lisa were in a valid legal
union at the time of the child’s birth.”).
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Virginia refused to recognize any rights arising from a civil union,132 which
presumably would have precluded the state from recognizing any
presumptive rights arising from such a relationship. Yet, that might mean
that if Janet were a parent by virtue of factors having nothing to do with a
civil union, then Virginia would have less reason to refuse to give effect to
that status.133
Whether or not the Vermont Supreme Court was motivated by such
reasoning to provide a different rationale upon which Janet’s parental status
might be based, the court explained why Janet qualified as a functional
parent.
It was the expectation and intent of both Lisa and Janet that Janet would
be IMJ's parent. Janet participated in the decision that Lisa would be
artificially inseminated to bear a child and participated actively in the
prenatal care and birth. Both Lisa and Janet treated Janet as IMJ's parent
during the time they resided together, and Lisa identified Janet as a
parent of IMJ in the dissolution petition. Finally, there is no other
claimant to the status of parent, and, as a result, a negative decision
134
would leave IMJ with only one parent.

The Miller-Jenkins court expressly declined to address which factors
were necessary or sufficient for a finding that someone was a functional
parent,135 leaving that issue for another day. Nonetheless, the Vermont court
at least seemed to recognize a status that it was unwilling to recognize in
Titchenal. Was the court recognizing this additional basis for Janet’s status
as a parent because there would then be less reason for Virginia to refuse to
recognize her parentage? That is unclear, especially because Virginia did
and does not recognize de facto parents.136 Nonetheless, a refusal to
132. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3, invalidated by Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d
456 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“Any … civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement entered
into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in
Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall be void and unenforceable.”).
133. See Mark P. Strasser, DOMA and the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 1011,
1016 (2010) (“A parental relationship established in another way, e.g., because one of the
individuals is a legal parent by virtue of being a functional parent, does not trigger DOMA
and is not subject to the same arguments for non-recognition.”).
134. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 970.
135. Id. at 971 (“Because so many factors are present in this case that allow us to hold
that the non-biologically-related partner is the child's parent, we need not address which
factors may be dispositive on the issue in a closer case.”).
136. See Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 498–99 (Va. App. 2008) (“We note that no
appellate court in Virginia has ever so applied the de facto parent doctrine, despite numerous
opportunities under analogous circumstances to do so. We likewise decline to do so now.”)
(citing Surles v. Mayer, 628 S.E.2d 563 (Va. App. 2006)); see also Rachel E. Shoaf, Note,
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recognize functional parent status under Virginia law might not be
dispositive in a case in which the question was whether to recognize a de
facto status granted in a different jurisdiction.137
The Vermont Supreme Court recently addressed functional parent
status in Moreau v. Sylvester138 in which the court addressed the parental
status of a former partner of a mother with children.139 Christopher Moreau
had “played a significant, father-figure role in both of the children's lives,
140
He and Noel Sylvester had “an on-again-off-again relationship for eight
to ten years, [although] they never married.”141
There was an existing “relief-from-abuse (RFA) order denying him
visitation with the children.”142 Moreau had had custody of the children
when Sylvester’s residence had been rendered uninhabitable due to
flooding,143 and she had testified that on at least one occasion during the
period his refusal to return the children to her had “created a dangerous
situation.”144 Sylvester was aware that Moreau owned a gun,145 and he
would sometimes arrive at her house uninvited after he had first made sure
that the person with whom Sylvester was currently living was still at
work.146 To make matters even more frightening, Sylvester had testified that
Moreau had sent her “a text message stating ‘I promise you, for the rest of
my life, I will find my girls and I will never stop, ever.’”147
The Moreau court discussed Vermont functional parent jurisprudence,
noting that the Titchenal court had found “no legal basis” 148 for “claims
Two Mothers and Their Child: A Look at the Uncertain Status of Non-biological Lesbian
Mothers Under Contemporary Law, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 267, 294 (2005)
(“While Virginia strictly adheres to a ‘traditional’ one mother and one father model, based
on a biological link, other states recognize the potential for functional parenthood to better
serve the needs of the parties seeking recognition of a parent-child relationship.”).
137. See Debra H. v. Janice R.,14 N.Y.3d 576, 601 (N.Y. 2010) (“New York will
recognize parentage created by a civil union in Vermont.”).
138. 95 A.3d 416 (Vt. 2014).
139. See id. at 422 (“Defendant contends that he is the children's de facto parent and
entitled to assert and be heard on custody, parentage and visitation rights.”).
140. See id. at 417.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 417–418 (Vt. 2014).
144. Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d 416, 417–418 (Vt. 2014).
145. Id. at 418.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 420.
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brought by putative de facto parents.”149 The Vermont court then addressed
its Miller-Jenkins reasoning, distinguishing the cases because “there is no
civil union, or any other legally recognized domestic relationship between
the parties [in Moreau] as [there had been] in Miller–Jenkins.”150 After
noting that “the children in this case are not the product of mutually-agreedupon artificial insemination,”151 the court summed up its position by
suggesting that “the parental rights recognized in Miller–Jenkins were
based upon statutory rights of civil union partners, not on any general
judicial endorsement of de facto parenthood.”152 The court denied that its
decision in Moreau foreclosed the possibility of de facto parentage
recognition in a case in which “two persons agree to conceive a child
through artificial insemination,”153 although the Miller-Jenkins court had
never implied that the agreement to conceive through artificial insemination
was key to a finding of functional parenthood.154
In dissent, Justice Robinson noted that the Miller-Jenkins court had
“identified a host of factors other than biology and a legal relationship with
an acknowledged parent as relevant to the question of who is a
parent.”155 Justice Robinson worried that Moreau seemed to stand for the
proposition that “if faced with facts identical to those presented in Miller–
Jenkins, except with parents who were not joined in a legally recognized
status at the time the child was conceived, this Court could deny the
nonbiological mother's claim out of hand.”156
The characterization of Moreau offered by the majority was rather
unsympathetic, although Justice Robinson offered a much different view.
[The] putative father has alleged that both children call him “daddy or
papa,” that he was in the delivery room when M.S. was born and was
one of the first people to hold her; he has been involved in L.M.'s life
since she was six months old and M.S.'s since birth—participating in
their respective first steps, first words, and other developmental

149. Id.
150. Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d 416, 422 (Vt. 2014).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 423 n.10.
154. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 971 (Vt. 2006). (“Because so
many factors are present in this case that allow us to hold that the nonbiologically-related
partner is the child's parent, we need not address which factors may be dispositive on the
issue in a closer case.”)
155. Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d at 435 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
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milestones; even before moving in with the children's mother, he visited
L.M. and M.S. almost every day during the first six months of M.S.'s
life; he lived with mother and the children from the time M.S. was about
six months old, in August 2006, through March 2009; he changed
diapers, tended to them when they cried in the middle of the night, and
did all the things a good father does when needed by his or her child; he
was involved with M.S.'s preschool programming; he went to all school
and ballet performances in which either child was involved; he provided
all the basic necessities for the children such as food, shelter and
clothing, and also paid for ballet lessons and school
supplies; after mother and the children moved out in March 2009 until
April 2011, he spent about 600 days of the next 730 days with the
children; in April 2011, their mother voluntarily left them to live with
him at least six days a week for nearly a year until March 2012; mother
frequently cancelled or no-showed for her regular scheduled visits with
the children during that time period; and mother abruptly removed the
children from the schools they were attending while living with putative
157
father with only three months remaining in the term.

Needless to say, the two characterizations of Moreau are very different
and might yield very different determinations with respect to whether the
children would be benefited or, instead, harmed by his having visitation
rights.158 Such a determination did not have to be made because Moreau’s
parental status was not recognized, although Justice Robinson pointed out
some of the possible detrimental effects of a refusal to recognize functional
parent status in her appeal to the Vermont Legislature to recognize that
status.
[T]he Legislature has the power to pass laws to ensure that other
children in L.M. and M.S.'s circumstances are not denied the continuing
financial, emotional, and developmental support of one of their actual
parents because their biological parent has ‘pulled rank’ and denied the
other's parental status after promoting and cultivating that parent's
159
relationship with the child for most or all of the children's lives.

It is not clear what to make of Moreau. Perhaps unsympathetic facts
drove the decision, including the potential for domestic violence.160
However, it might be noted that domestic violence did not preclude
recognition of functional parent status in the California case In re Nicholas

157. Id. at 446 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
158. See id. (“If the majority's analysis were to stand, the consequences for some
children, potentially including L.M. and M.S., would be nothing short of tragic.”).
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text.
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H.,161 notwithstanding that both the mother162 and the functional father163
had been violent with each other.
Nicholas H. involved a man, Thomas, who admittedly was not the
biological father of a boy named Nicholas,164 although both Thomas and the
boy’s mother, Kimberly, wanted Thomas “to act as a father to Nicholas.”165
Thomas “provided a home for Kimberly and Nicholas for several years.”166
Further, Thomas had a strong bond with the boy, while the boy’s biological
father had played no role in Nicholas’s life.167
The juvenile court found that Thomas’s presumptive parenthood of
Nicholas had not been rebutted.168 The California Supreme Court affirmed,
confident that permitting Thomas to have parental status would greatly
benefit Nicholas both because of the strong bond between the two and
because the child would otherwise be homeless.169
Nicholas H. and Moreau are distinguishable in that there was no
suggestion in the Moreau majority opinion that the children would face dire
consequences were Moreau’s parentage not recognized,170 although the
dissent suggested that the children might indeed thereby be harmed.171 An
additional consideration that might have been telling was that Moreau never
adopted the children, even though Vermont law had permitted such an

161. 28 Cal. 4th 56 (Cal. 2002).
162. Id. at 59 (“Most recently, the two fought over Nicholas during a holiday visit in
December 1999 at the home of Thomas's mother, Carol, who lives in Lakewood, California.
Kimberly attacked and bit Thomas. The police were called and Kimberly was arrested for
felony assault.”).
163. See id. at 60 (“Kimberly gave police a copy of a Los Angeles County protective
order dated September 3, 1998, restraining Thomas from having contact with Kimberly or
Nicholas until March 2, 2001.”).
164. Id. at 61.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See In re Nicholas H., 28 Cal. 4th 56, 58 (Cal. 2002) (“While his presumed father
is providing a loving home for him, his mother has not done so, and his biological father,
whose identity has never been judicially determined, has shown no interest in doing so.”).
168. See id. at 61.
169. See id. (discussing the strong bond between them); see also id. at 59 (“[T]his child
will be rendered fatherless and homeless.”).
170. See Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d 416, 437 (Vt. 2014) (suggesting that there were
no dire circumstances at issue that might justify placing children with a non-parent).
171. See id. at 446 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (“If the majority’s analysis were to stand,
the consequences for some children, potentially including L.M. and M.S., would be nothing
short of tragic.”).
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adoption.172 Indeed, the Vermont court likened what was at issue in Moreau
to what had been at issue in Titchenal, reasoning that “[p]artners of
heterosexual or same-sex couples could ‘protect their interests’ in potential
parentage through existing procedures.”173
One of the confusing aspects of the Vermont jurisprudence is that one
cannot tell whether it is Miller-Johnson rather than Moreau that is an outlier
or whether, instead, the cases are quite compatible.174 Further, one cannot
tell whether Miller-Johnson was recognizing functional parent status for a
limited time only175—one would not expect a court to announce that it was
adopting a temporary, alternative basis for parenthood to circumvent a
different state’s refusal to recognize parental status, even were that an
accurate depiction of what was happening. That said, the mere possibility
that the Miller-Johnson court was doing this does not establish that the
court in fact was temporarily offering another basis for parentage to help
protect a Vermont citizen’s parental rights.
Interestingly, a California court might have adopted a strategy
analogous to the (possible) strategy employed in Miller-Johnson to protect
a California citizen’s parental rights, although that court never stated that it
was doing so. Consider Charisma R. v. Kristina S.,176 which involved a
same-sex couple who entered into a California domestic partnership177
before having a child.178 The couple broke up a few months after the child’s
birth,179 and the issue before the intermediate appellate court was whether

172. See id. at 425 (majority opinion) (“Heterosexual couples could then and now, as
same-sex couples can now, achieve parentage rights through marriage or adoption.”).
173. See id.
174. See id. at 422 (“But the differences between Miller–Jenkins and the present case
far exceed their singular similarity of a now-estranged partner who shared child rearing with
the biological mother.”).
175. Cf. Richard Aborn & Marlene Koury, Toward a Future, Wiser Court: A Blueprint
for Overturning District of Columbia v. Heller, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1353, 1376 (2012)
(“Bush v. Gore . . . fashioned a unique, one-time-only reading of the Equal Protection Clause
to resolve a case of bottomless political import.”).
176. 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Cal. App. 2009).
177. See id. at 31–32 (“Charisma R. (Charisma) and Kristina S. (Kristina) were a same
sex couple who began dating in July 1997, moved in together in August 1998, and registered
as domestic partners with the State of California in January 2002.”).
178. See id. at 32 (“Kristina became pregnant by artificial insemination and gave birth
to Amalia in April 2003.”).
179. See id. (“In July 2003, Kristina moved out of the home she shared with Charisma,
taking Amalia with her.”).
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Charisma was a presumed parent. The court affirmed the lower court ruling
that she was.180
It might seem surprising that the Charisma R. court decided the case
entirely on presumed parent status and did not base the parentage decision
at least in part on the domestic partnership status of the parties181 mentioned
in the opinion,182 just as Miller-Johnson had based its parentage decision
partially183 or wholly184 on the civil union status of the parties. Kristina
having been living in Texas at the time of the decision185 might have played
some role in the framing of the opinion. Texas refuses to give effect to
rights arising out of civil unions,186 and the Charisma R. court might have
feared that parentage based on a domestic partnership status would be less
likely to be enforced in Texas.187 Both Charisma R. and Miller-Johnson
emphasized functional parentage where doing so seemed less likely to
provoke a non-recognition response in a sister state.

180. See id. at 34 (“Charisma bore the burden of proving she is a presumed parent
under section 7611(d) by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also id. at 45 (“The trial
court’s decision is well-supported by the evidence.”).
181. Cf. In re J.N., No. B235505, 2012 WL 2019891, at *1 (Cal. App. 2012) (“Rachel
N. is the biological mother of J.N., who was conceived with a sperm donor and was born in
2004. Rachel N. was in a registered domestic partnership with Kris F. at the time, and Kris
F. is therefore considered J.N.'s other parent.”) (citing CAL. FAM. CODE, §§
297, 297.5(d); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th 108, 119 (2005)).
182. See Charisma R., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 31–32.
183. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 967 (Vt. 2006) (“We find that
Janet has status as a parent, even beyond her stepparent status . . . .”).
184. See Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d 416, 422 (Vt. 2014) (“[T]he parental rights
recognized in Miller–Jenkins were based upon statutory rights of civil union partners, not on
any general judicial endorsement of de facto parenthood . . . .”).
185. See Charisma R., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52.
186. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(c), invalidated by De Leon v. Perry, 975 F.
Supp. 2d 632 (W. Tex. 2014) (“The state . . . not give effect to a: (1) public act . . . that
creates . . . a marriage between persons of the same sex . . . or (2) . . . claim to any legal
protection . . . asserted as a result of a marriage between persons of the same sex . . . in this
state or in any other jurisdiction.”).
187. Cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg et al., Family Law Scholarship Goes to Court:
Functional Parenthood and the Case of Debra H. v. Janice R., 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
348, 356 n.25 (2011) (“Charisma R. did not address the manner in which an out-of-state
civil union factors into recognizing parental rights.”); see also Rena M. Lindevaldsen, SameSex Relationships and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Reducing America to the Lowest
Common Denominator, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 29, 35–36 (2009) (“Kristina, a
Texas resident since summer 2005, faces the question of whether Texas courts, despite a
state defense of marriage act and constitutional amendment, will permit Charisma to register
and enforce the California custody order in the state of Texas.”).
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The claim here is not that the functional parent status was recognized
in Charisma R. as a way to circumvent non-recognition, because California
had already recognized that status in in the context of same-sex parenting
prior to the case.188 Further, Charisma and Kristina had planned to have a
child together and then did, which supported a finding of functional parent
status.189 The only potential difficulty for such a finding in this case
involved the amount of time that Charisma had parented Amalia before the
couple had broken up, although the intermediate appellate court did not find
that an insuperable difficulty.190
Did the Charisma R. court refuse to address the parental presumption
arising from the domestic partnership precisely because it did not want to
raise an issue that might jeopardize recognition of Charisma’s parenting
rights in another jurisdiction? That is unclear. The suggestion here is merely
that courts might adopt particular legal approaches out of a belief that
certain legal options have been unfairly denied to a particular group of
people, either within the state or in other states where local parties’ rights
might be at issue.191 If that is so and if states are precluded from refusing to
recognize same-sex marriage in light of the envisioned opinion, then one
might expect some courts to be less willing to provide equitable remedies in
certain kinds of cases.
IV. Conclusion

188. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 668 (Cal. 2005) (“We conclude that
the present case, like Nicholas H. and Salvador M., is not ‘an appropriate action’ in which to
rebut the presumption of presumed parenthood with proof that Elisa is not the twins’
biological parent.”).
189. See Charisma R., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 32 (“In December 2001, the couple decided
they wanted to have children and Kristina would be the first to try to become pregnant.
Following several months of effort, Kristina became pregnant by artificial insemination and
gave birth to Amalia in April 2003.”).
190. See id. (“We reject Kristina’s contentions that Charisma did not parent Amalia for
a sufficient period of time to be declared a presumed parent.”).
191. In Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013), the Kansas Supreme Court
upheld the enforceability of a parenting agreement. See id. at 558 (“the coparenting
agreement in this case does not violate public policy and is not unenforceable.”).
Enforcement was sought before the biological parent moved to Texas with the two children.
See id. at 545 (“A few months after the couple separated, Goudschaal notified Frazier that
she was taking the children to Texas, prompting Frazier to file this action, seeking inter
alia to enforce the coparenting agreement.”). Perhaps the concerns raised here played a role
in that decision as well.

330

21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 303 (2015)

Suppose that the United States Supreme Court were to hold that the
Federal Constitution protects the right to marry a same-sex partner. How
might such a ruling affect marriage and family law more generally?
States might try to create two differing marital statuses, affording
certain rights and obligations to one but not the other status. Were states to
do that and were they to reserve one of the statuses for different-sex and the
other status for same-sex couples, such a law would likely be struck down
in light of the guarantees recognized in Windsor and in the envisioned
opinion striking down same-sex marriage bans.
What effects would such a decision have on the rights of non-marital
couples? It seems likely that we will continue to have a divergence among
the states with respect to such rights. Some as a matter of public policy will
accord non-marital couples more rights and obligations, whereas others will
try to preserve or possibly increase the difference between marital and nonmarital status. Further, at least in the eyes of some, there will no longer be a
need to remedy the injustice that had been implicated in refusing to permit
same-sex couples to marry, thereby providing less incentive to mitigate the
differences between marital and non-marital couples.
We have not seen monumental changes in family law in those states
that recognize same-sex marriage whether as a matter of statute or of state
constitutional guarantees, which undermines the plausibility of the claim
that federal constitutional protection of the right to marry a same-sex
partner will bring about monumental changes. While family law will
continue to develop, federal constitutional protection of same-sex marriage
is unlikely to bring about the changes that some commentators had hoped
for and others had feared.192

192. Cf. Douglas Nejaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital
Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87, 97 (2014)
(“[C]ommunities where marriage lawsuits emerged . . . understood them as
[reflecting] radical gay politics and critiques of marriage. [Both] Baker and McConnell
suggested . . . their lawsuit might turn marriage ‘upside down.’” ); see also Elizabeth B.
Wydra, Reading the Opinions--and the Tea Leaves--in United States v. Windsor, 2013 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 95, 99 (2012–2013) (“In passing DOMA, the report from the House . . .
concluded, . . . . ‘The effort to redefine marriage to extend to homosexual couples is a truly
radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution of marriage.’”) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 104-664, at 12–13 (1996)).

